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The Economic Determinants 
of Military Expenditure in 
Selected East Asian Countries* 
ROBERT E. LOONEY and 
P. C. FREDERIKSEN 
This paper examines the economic determinants of defence spend-
ing in six East Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. It is hypothesized that 
economic factors play an important role in determining military 
spending levels in these countries. Our results, which support the 
earlier work by Geoffrey Harris, suggest that economic variables 
and resource availability are probably the main determinants of 
miiitary expenditures. Three basic patterns were found: stabiliza-
tion, augmentation, and distributed lags. While all countries 
increased their defence budgets as expected GNP increased, a 
significant variation between countries existed as to the timing of 
the increased defence allocations. The variations were so large that 
specific a priori generalizations could not be made as to how eco-
nomic constraints control the budgetary process in these countries. 
Introduction 
World military expenditures exceeded one trillion U.S. dollars for the 
very first time in 1987. While the developed countries' share increased 
to 83 per cent (from approximately 78 ~er cent in 1977) the developing 
countries' share declined to 5 per cent from 17 per cent.1 As noted 
by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this allocation of 
resources to defence represented more than 5 per cent of the world's 
aggregate product.2 
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Although annual growth in real military spending was zero for the 
world in 1987, the growth by developed countries (2.9 per cent between 
1982 and 1987) was matched by a decline in developing countries. In 
fact, the decline in the growth of military spending has accelerated since 
1984: from 2 per cent in 1985, to 5.8 per cent in 1986, to 9.1 per cent 
in 1987. Table 1 indicates the average annual real growth rate in defence 
spending by region for the developing countries.3 
TABLE 1 
Real Growth in Military Expenditures, 
1982-87, by Region 
Africa -1.3% 
East Asia 1.9 
Latin America -1.3 
Middle East -6.9 
South Asia 6.9 
SOURCE: United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers, 1988 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 19~9), p. 2 
The large decline in Middle East defence spending reflects negative 
growth rates in 13 of the 16 Middle East countries between 1984 and 
1987. The large increase in South Asia reflects large increases in defence 
outlays by Pakistan and India. 
Military spending patterns in the East Asian region show wide 
variability. Table 2 indicates the 1987 military burden (military expend-
itures [MILEXP] as a percentage of GNP) and military expenditures as a 
percentage of central government expenditures (CGE) for selected East 
Asian countries.4 
Prompted mainly by economists, there has been a growing interest 
in the economics of defence in developing nations since the late 1970s. 
Since the early studies by scholars such as Rothschild in 19775 and by 
Benoit in 19736, much of the research hf:!S focused on how military spend-
ing affects growth: does it hinder, help, or have a neutral effect on growth?7 
In the last several years, other researchers have questioned the direction 
of causality - that is, does defence "cause" growth or does growth allow 
developing countries the luxury of spending more on defence programmes?8 
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TABLE 2 
Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP and CGE, 
Selected East Asian Countries, 19878 
MILEXP/GNP MILEXP/CGE 
Burma 3.0% 20.9%b 
Taiwan 4.6 41.5 
Indonesia 2.1 8.6 
S. Korea 4.8 25.5 
Malaysia 3.2 9.7 
Philippines 1.3 7.8 
Singapore 5.5 15.1 * 
Thailand 3.7 18.3 
8 Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam excluded for lack of data 
ht986 
SOURCE: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Control, 1988 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1989). 
267 
Despite this effort, relatively little attention has been directed at 
investigating the determinants of defence spending especially in devel-
oping countries. As recently noted by Deger and West: 
The decisions respecting military expenditures and arms imports 
were generally viewed as being governed by exogenous factors, outside 
the considerations bearing on allocation of public resources for develop-
ment and civilian government services, and presented as a kind of 
budgetary 'Hobson's choice'. The conventional wisdom about the 
relation of military expenditure to economic performance derived 
from a very limited, almost casual, base of empirical observation.• 
As noted below, while most of the literature which pertains to the deter-
minants of defence has been aimed at the developed countries, there 
have been several studies which looked at the relationship for developing 
countries.10 However, as Deger and West noted: 
There is . . . little evidence as yet of a consensus with respect to 
the appropriate weighting of factors in an explanation of the allocation 
of resources to national defense or in a gtmerally-applicable model of 
the interactions between security and economic performance. 11 
The purpose of this paper is to extend the discussion on the eco-
nomic determinants of defence spending in developing countries. Time 
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series data for six East Asian countries are examined here: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. It is 
hypothesized that economic factors have played a significant role in deter-
mining military spending in these six countries. Furthermore, it is expected 
that the particular explanatory model will vary from country to country. 
If economic factors are found to be an important determinant of military 
expenditures, then any attempt to forecast future defence budgets without 
considering the economic aspects is likely to be incorrect. 
Review of the Literature 
As noted above, much of the literature has dealt with developed countries. 
For example, Griffin, Wallace, and Devine examined defence spending 
patterns in the United States between 1949 and 1976 and concluded that 
"military outlays [as a percentage of GNP] do appear to be employed 
as a counter-cyclical fiscal instrument by the state".12 
For the case of Canada, 'Ireddenick attempted to: 
pursue one particular line of thinking about military expenditures: 
namely, that the level and composition of a nation's military expend-
ituresJilay be significantly influenced by domestic economic imperatives 
which are independent of any security considerations. Thus, military 
expenditures may be undertaken to promote economic objectives 
but rationalized in terms of providing for national security.13 
Treddenick concluded that "large increases in Canadian defence expend-
itures have been influenced more by economic than security considerations".14 
Hill employed a sample of both developed and developing nations 
in his attempt to synthesize the various approaches used to examine 
the determinants of defence spending.15 Hill was unable to find one "over-
riding" factor which could explain the variance in defence spending 
patterns among the sample set. This led him to conclude that "the military 
spending level of any nation is likely to be a product of a number of 
separate forces", 16 which include arms races, military alliances, status 
and rank discrepancies in international systems, military aid, size and 
wealth of the country, the form of government, the extent of military 
involvement, internal social divisiveness, and internal political conflict. 
Arthur Westing in 1978 sought "to present some critical reflections 
that might prove useful to those conc~rned with military expenditures 
and proposals for their reductions".17 Using data for 159 countries, military 
expenditures were, in turn, regressed on population, land area (total and 
productive), and wealth (as proxied bv GNP). He concluded that: 
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The basic analyses ... revealed the existence of a moderately close 
correlation between military expenditures and GNP (r2 = 0.777), but 
very little correlation with population (r2 = 0.193). The correlation 
with total land area was quite good (r2 = 0.647) and that with productive 
land area somewhat better (r2 = 0.736.).1e 
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Westing repeated his analysis for 27 wealthy nations (nations with a 
GNP per capita that was double the combined GNP per capita of all 
the 159 countries) and found that military expenditures were closely 
correlated with population and productive land area. 
In an important paper which related defence spending to economic 
variables, Ames and Goff examined defence and education expenditures 
in sixteen South American countries for the twenty-year period between 
1948 and 1968.19 They found that political variables were not the major 
determinants of either education or defence budgets; instead, they con-
cluded that changes in the education and defence budgets were related 
to the level of available resources. 
O'Leary and Coplin suggested that the following factors might in-
fluence defence spending patterns in Latin America: 
economic condition of the country; 
role of the military in non-military affairs; 
internal security needs; 
arms races; 
military budgets in rival states; 
internal political support; 
age structure of existing equipment.20 
The only apparent correlation was between the military budget and arms 
races and the budget levels in rival states. Apparently, both of these 
factors acted as a "reference point" from which individual countries 
might set their own budget levels. 
More recently, Maizels and Nissanke attempted to quantify the major 
factors which have influenced military spending in 83 countries.21 They 
developed a conceptual matrix which distinguished between domestic, 
regional, and global conflicts on the one hand, and three potential in-
fluences on military expenditures (political framework, economic linkages, 
and military activity) on the other. They attempted to apply this conceptual 
model using cross-country regressions for the sample as a whole, and for 
separate regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They concluded: 
• 
The differences among developing countries in the relative size of their 
military burdens ... appear to reflect a complex of factors - domestic, 
regional, and global - which are not easy to disentangle, and which 
no doubt vary in emphasis from country to country . . . Domestic 
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factors, particularly the need perceived by ruling elites to repress 
internal opposition groups, and external factors, including relations 
with the global power blocs and the availability of foreign exchange 
to purchase arms from abroad, also appear to be major determinants 
of government decisions in regard to military expenditures.22 
In 1986, Harris attempted to measure the effect of domestic economic 
conditions since the early 1960s on military budgets in five ASEAN 
countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.z3 
His main findings were: 
1. Defence expenditures in the current year are positively correlated 
with both defence spending and the central budgetary position in 
the previous year. 
2. Current defence expenditures have a weak inverse correlation with 
inflation in the previous year. 
3. Although current defence budgets are not correlated with the balance 
of payments in the previous year, the balance of payments affects 
government revenue which in turn affects defence spending.z4 
David Denoon offered five theoretical explanations for recent patterns 
of defence expenditures in certain ASEAN countries.z5 These are: 
1. Governments respond to actual military threats; 
2. Domestic political concerns determine recruiting, the stationing of 
troops and levels of readiness; 
3. Resources allocated to defence are determined through the government 
system; 
4. Military-industrial complexes vie for shares of the defence budget; 
5. Arms races affect military budgets.zs 
In an extension of the Harris paper, Looney and Frederiksen used 
time series data to examine the economic determinants of defence expend-
itures for ten Latin American countries: Argentina, Peru, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador.z7 Four 
alternative models were tested. The independent variables were current 
and lagged values of GNP, government expenditure, and military expen-
ditures. It was found that "a large proportion of variability in defense 
expenditures can be explained by economic variables: the overall constraint 
(GDP) and fiscal funding variables .... "za 
The purpose of this paper is to extend Harris' work on Southeast 
Asia and our earlier work on Latin America. This paper examines how 
• 
military spending patterns have been affected by stabilization and infla-
tionary concerns (both expected and unexpected) in selected East Asian 
countries. The sample set consists of the five ASEAN countries studied by 
Harris (that is, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia) 
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but also includes South Korea for comparative purposes. All economic data 
are drawn from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)29 while defence 
expenditures are from the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research.30 All 
data have been deflated by the IMF GDP deflator (1980=100) except that 
the IMF's CPI deflator was used in the case of Indonesia.31 
The Models and Empirical Results 
Three basic models were estimated using regression analysis to examine 
the effect of resource availability (both expected and unexpected) on 
military expenditures (MILEXP). Model I, the short-run stabilization 
model, and Model II, the short-run augmentation model, are as follows: 
MILEXP1 = f (EXGNP1 , UNEXGNPi) 
where EXGNP is the expected level of GNP in time period t (based on 
the trend of past levels of actual GNP) and UNEXGNP is the unexpected 
GNP in the same period, and is defined as the difference between actual 
and expected GNP. 
For both models the hypothesized sign of the estimated coefficient 
for EXGNP is positive. In other words, the military will share part of 
the expected.increase in resource levels. This is the effect noted by Harris. 32 
However, if the unexpected GNP level is rising in Model I type 
countries, military expenditures are used as a stabilization tool. MILEX 
will be decreased to offset the higher unexpected GNP and to dampen 
expected inflation. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient will be 
negative. The opposite will hold true in Model II type countries. Countries 
which enjoy unexpected GNP increases treat them as "windfall gains" 
and concomitantly spend part of the gain on defence. Thus, the sign of 
the coefficient for UNEXGNP will be positive. 
Model III is a long-run distributed lag model in the following form:33 
MILEX1 = f (MILEXL, EXGNP1 , UNEXGNP1) 
where MILEXL is the lagged value of MILEX. In this structural form, 
as EXGNP increases, for example, MILEX will increase immediately in 
the current time period but will positively affect MILEX in future time 
periods. In other words, the effect of increased resources availability is 
not a year-to-year reaction but is spread out and "decays" over time. 
Country Resu1ts34 
The initial regression equation estimated for Singapore for the period 
1965-85 is:35 
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MILEX = .05 EXGNP - .07 UNEXGNP; (1) 
(13.67) ( - 2.22) 
R2 = .94; F = 106.29; DW 1.91; (3 .24 
These results indicate that defence spending patterns in Singapore con-
form to the stabilization model since UNEXGNP is negatively related 
to MILEX. In actuality, this means that policy-makers in Singapore are 
inclined to cut back military expenditures in response to increases in 
unexpected GNP. In other words, the amount of resources claimed by 
the military tends to decline during periods of unanticipated resource 
availability. Presumably, other activities, such as social and economic 
programmes, are the chief beneficiaries of any windfall resource gains. 
To confirm this, expected and unexpected deficits (EXDEF and UNEXDEF), 
and expected and unexpected inflation (EXINFL and UNEXINFL) were 
added to the model. The estimated equation is as follows: 
MILEX = .09 EXGNP -.10 UNEXGNP - .20 EXDEF 
(6.30) (-3.17) (-2.41) 
- .14 UNEXDEF - .69 EXINFL - 1.4 UNEXINFL; (2) 
( -3.92) ( -1.41) ( -1.98) 
.. 
R2 = .973; P = 65.18; DW = 1.74; (3 = .41; 
These results reinforce the stabilizing role that MILEX appear to play 
in Singapore. When the expected or unexpected surplus is declining (the 
deficit is increasing), defence budgets are reduced. Similarly, as inflation 
appears to be increasing, once again MILEX are reduced. 
The results for Malaysia between 1960 and 1986 suggest the existence 
of a pure augmentation model along the lines suggested earlier by Harris. 
As equation (3) indicates, the sign of the estimated coefficient for EXGNP 
and UNEXGNP are both positive and statistically significant. Inflationary 
and budgetary expectations did not appear to affect defence budgets 
in Malaysia. Instead, the country appears content to allocate a relatively 
constant proportion of its resources to the military. 
MILEX = .07 EXGNP + .23 UNEXGNP; (3) 
(4.43) (2.95) 
R2 = .56; F = 13.19; DW = 1.87; (3 .22; 
The results for the Philippines indicate a blend of the short-run 
stabilization model and the long-run distributed lag model: 
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MILEX = .35 MILEXL + .04 EXGNP - .63 UNEXGNP 
(1.90) (3.18) (-3.78) 
- .55 EXINFL + .77 UNEXINFL (4) 
(-4.12) (1.60) 
R2 = .75; F = 11.11; DW = 1.69; {3= .69; 
The Philippines exhibits a longer run expenditure adjustment pattern 
whereby the country gradually allocates resources to the military as 
the expected level of GNP increases. This is evidenced by the statistical 
significance of the lagged military expenditure term MILEX and the 
strong linkage with expected GNP (EXGNP). This picture should be 
qualified since short-run defence budgets are constrained by stabiliza-
tion concerns. These take the form of reductions in defence allocations 
stemming from increases in expected inflation (EXINFL) or overheating 
of the economy (UNEXGNP). 
The results for Thailand are reported as equation (5) and indicate 
a positive and statistically significant impact of the expected GNP level 
on defence expenditures in the same year. 
MILEX = .68 EXGNP - .26 UNEXGNP (5) 
(13.57) (-1.70) 
R2 = .91; F = 95.85; DW = 1.64; (3 .64; 
There is, however, a weak stabilization effect on defence budgets indicated 
by the negative coefficient on the unexpected GNP variable. 
The results for Korea suggest a long-term distributed lag model: 
MILEX = .75 MILEXL + .03 EXGNP - .04 UNEXGNP 
(3.64) (2.08) ( -1.43) 
- .03 EXINFL - .09 UNEXINFL; (6) 
( -1.09) (-1.90) 
R2 = .99; F = 303.58; DW = 1.94; (3 = .28; 
As the level of expected resources increases so does military expenditure 
but the effect is only felt over time. There are, however, three weak stabil-
izing effects which tend to ameliorate the resource enhancement effect as 
indicated by the negative signs for the estimated coefficients for UNEXGNP, 
and expected and unexpected inflation. 
Indonesia appears to be a special case where the variability in military 
expenditures from year to year can be explained by changes in crude 
petroleum production in the previous year (OILd and expectations about 
the budget surplus. The estimated equation is as follows: 
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MIL EX 1.70 OILL + .29 EXDEF 
(3.53) (3.26) 
- .33 EXINFL - .27 UNEXINFL (7) 
(-2.06) (1.98) 
R2 = .75; F = 7.52; DW = 2.19; (3 = .58; 
For the most part, the data for Indonesia indicate a pure augmentation 
approach. As either the petroleum output for the previous year or expected 
surplus increases, military spending increases. There is, however, a minor 
stabilizing effect: fears about expected and unexpected inflation tend to 
reduce MILEX. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Historically, conventional wisdom has assumed that political/strategic 
factors dominate year-to-year variations in Third World country military 
expenditures. Recent empirical studies, however, have suggested that eco-
nomic variables may play an important, if not dominant, role in structuring 
budgetary allocations to the military. Harris' work on Southeast Asia 
indicated that this was likely to be the case for the major developing 
countries in the region. 
The findings presented above support Harris' contention that eco-
nomic variables and resource availability are more than likely the main 
determinants of military expenditures. In extending his work, this paper 
has attempted to see if there is any uniformity in how individual countries 
spend extra resources. 
The results indicate three basic patterns: stabilization (Singapore), 
augmentation (Malaysia), and distributed lags (Philippines). All coun-
tries increased defence budgets as expected GNP increased. There were, 
however, significant variations between countries as to the timing of 
increased defence allocations. Specifically, Thailand exhibited a weak 
stabilization pattern. Korean defence expenditure patterns followed the 
long-run distributed lag function although as in the case of Thailand 
there was a weak stabilization effect. Indonesia was found to be a special 
case where resource availability was measured by crude oil production. 
However, there was a weak augmentation effect as measured by the 
expected and unexpected rate of inflation. 
In an earlier paper examining Latin• America, it was found that while 
economic constraints explained a large proportion of the variation of 
individual country allocations to defence, great diversity existed as to 
the manner in which these factors shaped the actual pattern of defence 
; 
The Economic Determinants of Military Expenditure 275 
allocations over time. These variations were so pronounced that it was 
impossible to form specific a priori generalizations about the manner 
in which economic constraints control the budgetary process in developing 
countries. This paper has confirmed that the same general conclusion 
holds true for selected countries in East Asia. 
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